How Poland Is Fighting Illegal Gambling-and What Turkey Could Learn
Poland is preparing a new measure in its campaign against illegal online gambling. From 1 September 2026, BLIK, one of the country’s leading domestic payment systems, is expected to reject transactions linked to gambling domains listed in the Polish Ministry of Finance’s register of unlawful gambling websites.
The importance of this step goes beyond ordinary website blocking. Instead of focusing only on access to illegal platforms, Poland is targeting the financial infrastructure that allows those operators to accept deposits and process payments. For Turkey, which has also spent years combating unlicensed bookmakers and illegal betting networks, the Polish model offers several practical lessons.
Why blocking websites alone is insufficient
Poland has long relied on a public register of domains used to provide gambling services in violation of national law. Under the country’s Gambling Act, payment providers are not permitted to offer services to websites included on that list. Companies that fail to comply may face fines of up to PLN 250,000.
The register is actively maintained by the Ministry of Finance. However, a blacklist can only be effective if illegal operators remain on the same domains. In practice, they often respond quickly by launching replacement websites, creating mirror pages or moving their technical infrastructure to new addresses.
This creates a familiar cycle: authorities identify and block a domain, the operator opens another one, and the enforcement process begins again. A website may disappear from search results or become inaccessible through local internet providers, yet the business itself can continue operating through alternative addresses.
Polish parliamentary discussions have recognised this weakness. Illegal gambling companies frequently use technical methods designed to avoid the consequences of inclusion in the official register. Domain rotation and mirror sites allow them to remain available to customers while slowing down regulatory action.
BLIK brings payments into the enforcement process
The planned BLIK measure adds a new layer to Poland’s strategy. Polski Standard Płatności, the company operating BLIK, is understood to have connected its payment infrastructure to the Ministry of Finance’s register through an application programming interface.
This connection should allow the system to identify whether a domain associated with a gambling transaction appears on the official blacklist. If it does, the payment can be rejected.
The difference between the traditional and expanded models is substantial:
Traditional approach: illegal website → domain identified → website blocked → replacement domain created.
Payment-based approach: illegal website → domain identified → official register updated → payment system checks the domain → transaction refused.
This will not eliminate unlawful gambling by itself. Users may still encounter illegal platforms, and operators may attempt to use alternative payment methods. Nevertheless, disrupting deposits directly attacks one of the most important elements of the illegal gambling business model.
Payment providers are becoming regulatory gatekeepers
The Polish example reflects a broader change in gambling regulation. Banks, electronic-money institutions, payment processors and domestic wallet providers are no longer viewed merely as neutral intermediaries. Their systems can determine whether an unlicensed operator is able to receive money from customers.
Polish financial authorities have increasingly urged payment companies to take a more active role in preventing transactions connected with illegal gambling. In 2025, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority issued sector-wide warnings highlighting the risks associated with processing payments for unlicensed operators.
This approach places payment institutions inside the regulatory perimeter. They are expected to use compliance systems, domain data and transaction monitoring tools to identify prohibited activity. The success of such a model depends on clear legal duties, reliable data and rapid communication between public authorities and private companies.
Why the Polish model matters for Turkey
Turkey has adopted a particularly strict position on unauthorised sports betting. Law No. 7258 forms the central legal framework for betting and games of chance connected with football and other sporting events.
Turkish enforcement powers extend beyond the operators themselves. Authorities may also pursue individuals who organise or facilitate illegal betting, provide access to foreign betting websites, transfer funds connected with unauthorised betting or advertise such services. Article 5 provides serious penalties depending on the specific conduct involved.
Turkey already has a strong legal basis for combating illegal betting. The key question is therefore not whether additional prohibitions are needed, but how enforcement can become faster, more coordinated and more effective against operators that constantly change domains, payment accounts and technical infrastructure.
Five lessons Turkey could draw from Poland
1. Target payment infrastructure, not only individual accounts
Closing a bank account or blocking one payment channel can be useful, but illegal operators often open replacement accounts or shift transactions through intermediaries. A more durable strategy would focus on the infrastructure used to process payments across multiple services.
Turkey could develop standardised procedures requiring payment institutions to reject transactions associated with officially identified illegal betting domains. This would reduce dependence on case-by-case account closures.
2. Establish one authoritative technical blacklist
A central, continuously updated register would give banks and payment companies a single source of regulatory information. The list should include domains, mirror websites and other technical identifiers connected with unlawful operators.
It would also need a fast update mechanism. If a new domain can begin operating within minutes, a blacklist that is updated only periodically will always remain behind the market.
3. Connect regulators and payment companies through secure technology
The Polish plan shows the value of automated data exchange. Instead of requiring each payment provider to download and manually process lists, regulators can offer a secure API that supplies current information in real time.
For Turkey, such a system could connect the relevant authorities with banks, electronic-wallet providers, payment institutions and card networks. Automated checks would make enforcement more consistent and reduce delays caused by manual communication.
4. Treat legal operators as a separate and visible category
Effective enforcement should not create unnecessary uncertainty for licensed betting businesses. Regulators can maintain clear lists of authorised operators, standardise their domain names and require transparent payment references.
A customer should be able to distinguish a licensed service from an illegal bookmaker easily. Clear branding, verified domains and predictable payment channels would make it harder for unlawful operators to imitate legitimate companies.
5. Combine financial disruption with advertising controls
Illegal betting depends not only on websites and payments but also on promotion. Social media advertising, influencer marketing, messaging applications and affiliate networks can direct users to new platforms almost immediately.
Turkey could strengthen coordination between gambling regulators, digital platforms, advertising authorities and payment companies. Removing advertisements while blocking deposits would make it more difficult for replacement operators to rebuild their customer base.
The limits and risks of a payment-blocking system
A payment-based model must be designed carefully. Domain-based blocking may produce false positives if a website hosts unrelated content or if an operator’s domain is mistakenly added to the register. There must be a transparent process for correction, review and removal.
Authorities should also define how transactions are assessed. A simple domain match may be appropriate for direct online payments, but more complex arrangements can involve payment intermediaries, prepaid products, cryptocurrencies or foreign wallets. The system therefore needs risk-based monitoring rather than reliance on a single technical indicator.
Privacy and data protection are equally important. Payment companies should receive only the information necessary to comply with the law, while customers should have access to clear explanations when a transaction is refused.
A long-term strategy rather than a single technical fix
Illegal operators will continue searching for alternatives. They may use foreign payment services, informal transfers, cryptocurrencies, cash-based methods or networks of third-party accounts. As a result, blocking one payment channel cannot be treated as a complete solution.
The strongest framework combines several measures: domain blocking, payment monitoring, advertising restrictions, action against facilitators, cooperation with internet providers and international coordination. Each layer makes the illegal business more expensive and less reliable.
Poland’s planned BLIK integration is therefore important not because it solves every problem, but because it changes the point of enforcement. Instead of repeatedly chasing new websites, authorities can interfere with the financial process that sustains them.
For Turkey, the central lesson is clear: a strong legal framework becomes more effective when it is connected to real-time technical systems and payment infrastructure. By creating an authoritative blacklist, automating information exchange and making financial providers active participants in enforcement, Turkey could move from reacting to illegal betting networks toward disrupting their business model at its core.